# Host Affordance Bridge (https://jackin.tailrocks.com/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-design/)



**Research state:** Incomplete

**Verification cutoff:** 2026-08-12. Revalidate terminal, clipboard, and runtime integration capabilities after this date.

## Research question [#research-question]

How can jackin❯ restore selected host-local terminal affordances for containerized agents without weakening the host-container trust boundary?

## Headline findings [#headline-findings]

* Image clipboard data often never enters the terminal byte stream, so Capsule cannot reconstruct it with input parsing alone.
* The responsible fix is a host-owned attach client that captures host-only actions and sends typed, bounded requests through authenticated local channels.
* Clipboard images and files must be validated, staged into container-readable storage, attributed to a session, and cleaned up predictably.
* URL opening and container-file export use the same capability boundary but require independent allowlists, path policy, and visible operator feedback.
* OSC 52, Kitty graphics, host-path paste, broad bind mounts, and agent-specific attachment APIs do not provide a complete or safe bridge.
* The bridge remains an explicit optional capability layer. Unsupported actions fail visibly and do not gain generic host command access.

## Method and evidence [#method-and-evidence]

The study combines jackin❯ runtime architecture, agent CLI behavior, Ghostty and terminal protocols, herdr’s host-client design, tmux clipboard behavior, remote-terminal products, and platform file/clipboard mechanisms. Sources remain beside the claims they support.

## Limitations and open questions [#limitations-and-open-questions]

* Validate paste-trigger behavior across Ghostty, Terminal.app, iTerm2, SSH, tmux, and supported Linux display servers.
* Select native clipboard libraries and fallbacks by measured capability and permission behavior.
* Define multi-client attach ownership, staging lifetime, directory export, and destination policy.
* Keep link-opening and file-export policy narrow enough to prevent arbitrary host execution or writes.

## How to read [#how-to-read]

1. [Host affordance evidence](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-design/01-host-affordance-evidence/)
2. [Product contract and boundaries](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-design/02-product-contract/)
3. [Architecture and security](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-design/03-architecture-and-security/)
4. [Alternatives and open questions](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-design/04-alternatives-and-open-questions/)

## Related work [#related-work]

* [Host Affordance Bridge Preflight](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/host-affordance-bridge-preflight/)
* [Custom operator tools](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/custom-operator-tools-design/)
* [Operator handler system](/research/product/operator-experience/host-affordances/operator-handler-system-design/)
* [Host Affordance Bridge roadmap](/roadmap/clipboard-image-bridge/)